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HOME » MONETARY LESSONS FROM THE NOT-SO-GREAT DEPRESSION
Explanation vs. Prescription
By Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
Response Essays
September 21, 2009
ike others, I was unfamiliar with the work of Scott Sumner before
he started his blog, “The Money Illusion” last February. But since
then, his posts have proved so powerful, innovative, and
challenging that he has commanded the attention of prominent
macroeconomists from nearly all perspectives. Sumner’s distinctive analysis
— what might be labeled “neo-monetarism” — strives to provide both an
explanation for the financial crisis and a prescription for monetary policy.
Let me comment first on his causal explanation, with an excursion of my
own into the development of economic thought. The business cycle remains
the major unresolved problem in macroeconomics. None of the competing
theories have yet achieved a consensus within the profession, in part
because none are fully satisfactory. As a result, the business cycle has, over
my lifetime, migrated from the front end of most macro texts to the back
end, situated behind the topics of growth and inflation, about which
economists know and agree more. So we must approach this problem with a
measure of epistemic humility.
Outside of real business cycle theory and Austrian business cycle theory, all
the alternatives, including Sumner’s, blame depressions and recessions on
negative shocks to what economists call aggregate demand, the total level of
spending. Orthodox monetarists attributed such shocks to declines in the
rate of monetary growth, whereas traditional Keynesians blamed declining
autonomous expenditures. Both of these sources are captured in the well
known equation of exchange: MV = Py, in which MV (money times its
velocity) is equivalent to aggregate demand, and Py represents nominal
GDP, the product of the price level and real output. In other words, a fall in
velocity (V) is equivalent to a Keynesian fall in autonomous expenditures,
which can happen only if people in the aggregate are holding (or hoarding)
more money. Although this basic truth is sometimes overlooked in the
recent debates over fiscal policy, in which economists replay (often with far
less theoretical sophistication, despite greater mathematical pizzazz) the
forgotten Keynes versus the Classics controversies, a negative shock to
aggregate demand must involve either (a) a decline in the money stock’s
growth rate or (b) an increase in the demand for money.
During the 1980s the behavior of velocity became more erratic than
seemed consistent with monetarist predictions. Many macroeconomists
turned toward a New Keynesian synthesis, in which shocks can arise from
either M or V, and the goal of monetary policy is to offset them. The best
way to do that, according to New Keynesians, is with some kind of interest-
rate target, like the famous Taylor Rule, which allegedly adjusts for the
impact of inflationary expectations on observed interest rates, so that the
Fed can stabilize growth of MV and thus Py.
The recent recession actually raises two related questions: (1) what caused
the initial downturn in late 2007; and (2) why did a mild, garden-variety
recession start to turn into a major financial panic in late 2008. The same
two questions apply to the Great Depression, despite the fact that the
current recession is so far nowhere near as severe. A recession that began
in 1929 only turned into a Great Depression beginning in October 1930 with
the most massive series of banking panics not just in U.S. history but also in
world history. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz’s seminal
1963 study, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960,
decisively confirmed for almost all macroeconomists the role of this severe
banking crisis in bringing on what Friedrich Hayek called a “secondary
deflation,” although economic historians still debate what triggered the
banking panics and what caused the initial recession. Friedman and
Schwartz held Fed-induced monetary tightness responsible for both;
Keynesians continue to blame velocity shocks; the Austrians attribute the
initial 1929 downturn to a malinvestment bubble brought on by monetary
expansion during the 1920s; whereas New Classical economists along with
other supply-siders sometimes point to such supply-side shocks as the
Smoot-Hawley tariff.
Sumner attributes the mild recession that began in 2007 to the supply-side
shock of subprime defaults. His real concern, however, is the subsequent
financial panic. Although he identifies monetary policy that was too tight as
the underlying cause of increasing distress, he defines “tight” and “loose”
relative to velocity rather than relative to the money stock. What he is
really saying is that for some unspecified reason the economy was hit with a
negative velocity shock, and the Fed failed to respond promptly and
strongly enough. I would like to see him address in greater detail the origins
of this shock; attributing it to an expected future decline in nominal GDP
doesn’t get us very far. Did these expectations result from the subprime
crisis, from an unpredictable attack of Keynesian “animal spirits,” from the
declining rates of monetary growth over the previous five years, or from
something else? In fact, I believe he goes a bit too far when he suggests that
it was the fall in aggregate demand that caused all the financial failures.
Surely, once the process is underway, you can have both reinforcing each
other, as clearly happened during the Great Depression.
Sumner’s focus on 2008 is thus consistent with a variety of stories about
the earlier onset of recession, even the Austrian story that David
Henderson and I critiqued in our Cato Briefing Paper and in our reply to
critics, as well as our preferred story that brings in volatile international
savings flows. Yet Sumner has convinced me that in light of the looming
financial panic, whatever its source, Ben Bernanke’s response of targeted
bailouts was too tight as well as misdirected. Beginning with the Fed’s
creation of the Term Auction Facility in December 2007, nearly every
dollar that Bernanke injected into financial institutions was sterilized with
the withdrawal of dollars through the sale of Treasury securities. Not until
September 17, 2008, did a panicked Fed finally set off a monetary
explosion, doubling the base in less than four months.
Even then, as Sumner astutely emphasizes, Bernanke accompanied this
inflationary step with the deliberately deflationary step of paying interest
on bank reserves. Henderson observes in a recent post how this stands in
marked contrast to what Alan Greenspan did when faced with a mere whiff
of panic in anticipation of Y2K and after 9/11. In both instances, Greenspan
flooded the system with liquidity and then, when any financial uneasiness
calmed, rapidly pulled the money back out, a policy far more consistent with
the implications of Freidman’s research. I thus am persuaded that financial
failures under Bernanke would have been far less serious if the Fed had
simply started expanding the base well before September, and had done so
without any direct bailouts that exacerbated moral hazard.
I also wholeheartedly accept Sumner’s criticisms of the current obsession
with interest rates as the indicator of monetary policy. I have repeatedly
stated myself that interest rates, whether real or nominal, have never
proved an adequate gauge of what central banks are doing: not during the
Great Depression, when nominal rates were very low despite a collapsing
money stock; not during the Great Inflation of the 1970s, when nominal
rates were high despite an expanding money stock; not during Japan’s lost
decade; and not under Greenspan or Bernanke. Moreover, Sumner is
absolutely right that zero interest rates are no obstacle to an expansionary
monetary policy. The Fed could easily increase the monetary base well
beyond its current $1.7 trillion with traditional open market operations
alone, up to the Treasury’s total outstanding debt of nearly $7 trillion, while
avoiding any loans whatsoever to specific depositories, investment banks, or
other financial institutions. Eventually some of those reserves would be
converted into currency, which the public would start spending.
What does cripple monetary expansion is paying interest on reserves,
something other major central banks were already doing before the Fed.
The practice is not merely deflationary, other things equal. It essentially
converts monetary policy into fiscal policy, since in effect the Fed is now
doing the same thing as the Treasury, borrowing money on one side of the
balance sheet, through interest earning reserve deposits, in order to spend
or lend it on the other side. Symptomatic of this subtle transition in the
Fed’s role was the fact that in the midst of its monetary explosion, the Fed’s
total balance sheet exceeded the monetary base by half a trillion dollars.
That difference represented money that the Treasury had borrowed from
the public for the express purpose of lending it to the Fed, which in turn
employed it for more loans, in this case, primarily foreign currency swaps.
In short, interest-earning reserves have created a self-fulfilling Keynesian
liquidity trap. And if one inspects some of the most advanced academic
writing on monetary policy, one discovers that some central bankers now
view centrally planning the economy’s interest rate as their primary
function, with the ultimate ideal of separating that role entirely from
anything happening to the money stock.
This brings us to the second issue of monetary prescriptions. Here I
decisively depart from Sumner’s recommendations. I agree with him that
the Taylor Rule or other forms of interest-rate targeting are inadequate.
But his alternative, to somehow have central banks target expectations
about nominal GDP growth, has its own defects. It does, admittedly,
preclude a Fed tightening during negative supply shocks, when the price
level should be allowed to rise to reflect increasing scarcity. Indeed, it was
probably such shocks from climbing oil and commodity prices in 2007 that
encouraged a Fed reaction to the subprime crisis that was too tight. But this
advantage over straight inflation targeting is something Sumner’s Rule has
in common with the Taylor Rule.
On the down side, Sumner’s Rule implicitly shares the current bias against
any price deflation at all. Sudden, sharp deflation, which generates serious
economic dislocations, should be distinguished from mild, secular deflation.
The latter has historically been benign, and George Selgin has argued that it
is actually optimal. Of course, Sumner could in theory set the target for the
growth of nominal GDP expectations at zero or even at a negative rate. But
the more critical defect of Sumner’s Rule is its blithe assumption that
money, unlike any other good or service, requires not merely government
provision but detailed, sophisticated, and flexible government management.
Which brings me full circle to my earlier caution about epistemic humility.
No one yet knows or understands the full causes and cures for the business
cycle, and any claim to the contrary is pure intellectual hubris. As we have
already observed, Sumner himself is somewhat tentative about what
brought on the initial downturn in 2007 and silent on how or why this
evolved into a negative velocity shock. It may well be that Sumner’s Rule
would outperform the alternatives tried so far, but in light of the Fed’s inept
and often disastrous record until the Great Moderation during the two
decades following the mid-1980s, that is not saying a lot. Would Sumner be
willing to bet against any future research or financial innovations either
discrediting his rule or making it obsolete? Moreover, even if Sumner’s Rule
is the best we can ever expect from the State’s central bank, how likely is it
that the rule will be adopted and consistently applied? Does anyone really
believe that political pressures had absolutely no influence on Bernanke’s
bailouts?
Given that the financial sector, from which business cycles apparently
emanate, is one of the most heavily regulated within the U.S. today and, in
fact, has never been fully deregulated, ever, we should instead be looking at
deregulation and privatization, rather than better fine tuning. Sumner has, I
believe, made a major contribution to the debate over the recent recession.
Yet with all his close attention to the work of Milton Friedman and his
sympathy for free markets, I am puzzled that he has said little (as far as I
know) about Friedman’s conclusion that private currency issued under the
Aldrich-Vreeland Act headed off a panic in 1914 and would have done a far
better job than the Federal Reserve during the Great Depression. Nor am I
aware of his addressing the arguments of Selgin and Lawrence H. White
that free banking would spontaneously stabilize MV through the automatic
operation of the clearing system. In the final analysis, only abolition of the
Fed, elimination of government fiat money, and complete deregulation of
banks and other financial institutions offer any long-term hope of bringing
better macroeconomic stability.
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